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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY V. STRAND, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC., and 
ALMON COVEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRINCE-COVEY & CO., INC. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent Jerry V. Strand (referred to 
hereinafter as plaintiff) brought this action alleging that 
defendant-appellant Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. (herein-
after defendant1), converted negotiable securities allegedly 
owned by plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for the Third Judicial District in 
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall 
presiding, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
1The trial court did not enter judgment against the indi-
vidual defendant, Almon Covey, and plaintiffs claims against 
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ment and awarded damages of $26,000. Defendant's 
subsequent motion to set aside judgment and for rehearing 
was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an order of this court vacating the 
summary judgment rendered by the trial court and re-
manding the case for further proceedings. In the alterna-
tive, if the judgment is affirmed, defendant seeks an order 
of this court directing satisfaction of the judgment by set-
off against a prior final judgment obtained by defendant 
against plaintiff in the amount of $34,696.16, together 
with interest, no part of which has been satisfied to date. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During 1972 defendant Prince-Covey & Co. incurred 
substantial losses from transactions in which its employee, 
Mr. Ted England, acted as trader and from the failure of 
Mr. England's customers to pay for purchases on accounts 
for which he acted as account executive. As is customary 
in the brokerage business, Mr. England had agreed to re-
pay his employer for the losses. (R. 19-20). 
Almon Covey, the president and a director of de-
fendant Prince-Covey & Co., inquired as to when defend-
ant might expect payment and was advised by Mr. Eng-
land that the latter had a personal loan at Murray First 
Thrift & Loan of Salt Lake City secured by the pledge of 
4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock. These shares 
had a current market value greater than the total of Mr. 
England's loan. Mr. England agreed that if defendant 
2 
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would pay Mr. England's debt to Murray First Thrift, 
thereby obtaining release of the stock, Mr. England would 
sell the stock, repay defendant for the Murray First Thrift 
payment and use the balance of the proceeds to pay or 
reduce his debt to defendant. (R. 20). 
Mr. Covey accompanied Mr. England to Murray 
First Thrift where Mr. Covey delivered defendant's check 
to pay the loan and Murray First Thrift released and de-
livered to Mr. England certificates representing at least 
4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock. The certifi-
cates were in bearer form; neither plaintiff's nor Mr. Eng-
land's name appeared on them. Mr. Covey and Mr. Eng-
land returned to the Prince-Covey & Co. offices where 
4,000 shares of the stock were deposited in England's per-
sonal account and sold. The proceeds were given to de-
fendant Prince-Covey & Co. to repay it for the money 
advanced to Murray First Thrift and to pay or reduce 
England's debt to defendant. (R. 20). The balance of the 
stock was retained by England. (R. 37). 
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he owned the 
4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock and had 
"pledged" them in January of 1972 to Mr. England, who 
in turn had pledged them to Murray First Thrift. There is 
no explanation as to what plaintiff means when he says he 
"pledged" the stock. Defendant, in its answer, denied 
plaintiff's allegations of ownership, and, in any event, 
Mr. Almon Covey's affidavit denied knowledge or belief 
of such a fact. (R. 23-24), Plaintiff Jerry Strand filed no 
affidavit to support his purported ownership of the stock 
or to support any other allegation in his complaint. Mr. 
3 
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England's affidavit stated that he "borrowed" the stock 
from plaintiff and that he "knew" plaintiff owned it. (R. 
19-21). Mr. England's affivadit contains strained and self-
serving statements to the effect that Mr. Covey might 
have inferred that plaintiff owned the stock. (R. 20-21). 
At the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, in addition to the complaint and answer, the 
court considered the affidavit of Mr. Ted England filed by 
plaintiff (R. 19-21) and the affidavit of Mr. Almon Covey 
filed by defendant. (R. 23-24). Mr. Covey's affidavit was 
presented to the court at the commencement of the hear-
ing, although it appears in the record after the minute 
entry noting the granting of summary judgment, 
Defendant filed additional affidavits in support of its 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for Rehearing from 
Michael F. Heyrend (R. 44-45), Almon Covey (R. 34-43), 
and David Nelson (R. 46-51). For the convenience of the 
court, the complaint, answer, and affidavits are included as 
appendixes to this brief, except for the record of Ted 
England's personal trading account which was attached 
to Mr. Covey's second affidavit. 
The trial court ruled that defendant's lack of knowl-
edge of plaintiff's ownership or claim of ownership was 
not a defense to a claim for conversion of negotiable se-
curities. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that, even if 
knowledge was a necessary element in the conversion of 
negotiable securities, Mr. England's knowledge of plain-
tiff's alleged ownership must be imputed to defendant 
because of the employer-employee relationship between 
4 
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them. The trial court so ruled despite the statements in 
Mr. England's affidavit that he and defendant were ad-
verse parties with respect to this transaction. Moreover, 
Mr. England's affidavit indicates clearly that his dealings 
with plaintiff were not of a nature that would further 
his employer's interests, since Mr. England was acting on 
his own behalf and for his own benefit. (R. 20). 
There is nothing in the record to indicate when plain-
tiff received notice of the alleged conversion. An affidavit 
of Mr. Mark E. McBride, not controverted by defendant, 
establishes that on one day in September 1972 Hoffman 
Resources Corporation was quoted at $6.25 bid and $6.75 
asked. (R. 12). 
The affidavit of Michael F. Heyrend (R. 44-45) filed 
in connection with defendant's motion for a new hearing 
establishes that on or about May 11, 1972, in the earlier 
case of Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. v. Jerry V. Strand, de-
fendant Prince-Covey & Co. was awarded judgment 
against plaintiff in the amount of $34,696.16 for plaintiffs 
failure to pay for stock he ordered.2 In the course of de-
fendant's attempts to collect this judgment, plaintiff gave 
testimony pursuant to an order in supplemental proceed-
ings on July 20, 1972 and testified under oath that as of 
that date he owned no stock of any company other than 
7,000 to 8,000 shares of Dusenberg Corporation, that he 
owned options on 20,000 shares of Hoffman Resources 
stock at $3.00 per share, but did not then own any Hoff-
2
 The judgment set out in Mr. Heyrend's affidavit was af-
firmed by this Court; Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. v. Strand, 29 
Utah 2d 224, 507 P.2d 708 (1973). 
5 
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man Resources stock, and that the only note or chose in 
action he owned was a $5,000 debt owed by a Mr. Al 
Johnson. At no point in the course of the examination, 
during which plaintiff was asked specifically what shares 
of stock he owned, was the Hoffman Resources stock in 
question in this lawsuit mentioned. (R. 44-45). This testi-
mony of July 20, 1972 directly contradicts plaintiff's alle-
gation of ownership in his complaint because in the in-
stant action plaintiff alleges that he "pledged" the Hoff-
man stock to England in January 1972 (R. 1), that the 
stock was then pledged by England to Murray First Thrift 
in January 1972 (R. 19) and that plaintiff owned the 
stock on August 2, 1972, the date of the alleged conver-
sion. (R. 1). 
In his affidavit filed in support of the motion for re-
hearing, Mr. Almon Covey established that the Murray 
First Thrift loan was repaid and the shares obtained on 
August 2, 1972. (R. 36). Mr. England's affidavit, which 
was used by the court below to fix damages, stated that the 
shares were obtained and sold on approximately Septem-
ber 13, 1972. (R. 20). Mr. England's personal account 
which was attached to Mr. Covey's affidavit supports Mr. 
Covey's position and contradicts the position of Mr. Eng-
land. (R.43). 
In the same affidavit, Mr. Covey discloses the details 
of Mr. England's position with Prince-Covey & Co. Mr. 
England was allowed to maintain a private brokerage ac-
count at Prince-Covey & Co., the use and maintenance of 
which was entirely personal and was not related to his 
duties as a registered representative of defendant. (R. 35-
36). Mr. England's debt to Prince-Covey & Co. arose from 
6 
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losses on his unauthorized actions or administrative errors 
as a trader and a registered representative and this debt 
was entirely personal to Mr. England and established be-
tween him and defendant Prince-Covey & Co. the re-
lationship of debtor-creditor. (R. 36) It was within the 
context of this debtor-creditor relationship that Mr. Covey 
agreed to advance money for the repayment of the loan 
to Murray First Thrift and Mr. England agreed that, upon 
obtaining the shares of Hoffman Resources, he would sell 
the same and repay the amount of the Murray First Thrift 
loan plus all or a portion of his debt to defendant. (R. 
36). The sale of the shares was effected through Mr. Eng-
land's personal account. (R. 37). 
The record of Mr. England's personal account attach-
ed to Mr. Covey's affidavit shows conclusively that there 
was a substantial number of trades in the Hoffman Re-
sources stock during the year 1972, contrary to the state-
ments contained in Mr. England's affidavit. (R. 39-43). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THERE WERE UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PLAINTIFF WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Substantial issues of material facts remained unre-
solved when the trial court entered its judgment. No evi-
dence was before the court from which it could properly 
fix a date for determining the value of the stock allegedly 
converted. There were no facts other than the allegations 
7 
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of the complaint establishing plaintiffs ownership of the 
stock. The pleadings and affidavits placed squarely in 
issue the question of whether defendant was a bona fide 
purchaser of the negotiable securities. Defendant intro-
duced evidence establishing that it acted as a bona fide 
purchaser and therefore took the securities free and clear 
of any adverse claims. Mr. Almon Covey's affidavit estab-
lished defendant as a bona fide purchaser of the negoti-
able securities since the defendant had no knowledge of 
plaintiff's purported ownership interest in the stock. On 
this issue the only way the trial court could find such 
knowledge in light of Mr. Covey's affidavit was to impute 
Ted England's knowledge to defendant. This was error 
since England's interests were established in the record as 
adverse to defendant's with respect to the transactions in 
question. 
A. KNOWLEDGE OF AN ADVERSE CLAIM IS 
A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO LIABILITY FOR 
CONVERSION OF A NEGOTIABLE SECURITY AND 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING KNOWL-
EDGE TO BE UNNECESSARY OR IN IMPUTING 
SUCH KNOWLEDGE TO DEFENDANT. 
Although in most instances a purchaser of goods may 
be liable for their conversion even though he is without 
knowledge of any adverse claims,3 the rule is opposite with 
3
 "Although conversion results only from intentional con-
duct it does not however require a conscious wrongdoing, but 
only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods 
inconsistent with the owner's right . . . thus a bona fide pur-
chaser of goods for value from one who has no right to sell them 
becomes a converter when he takes possession of such goods." 
Allred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958). See 
also Restatement 2d, Torts, §229. 
8 
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respect to a bona fide purchaser of negotiable securities. 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code (§70A-8-301(2), 
Utah Code Annotated) provides: 
A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring 
the rights of a purchaser also acquires the security 
free of any adverse claim? (Emphasis added.) 
If Prince-Covey & Co. was a bona fide purchaser, it 
took the securities free of any adverse claim, including 
plaintiff's, and plaintiff has a cause of action only against 
Mr. England for his admitted conversion of the stock. 
This section of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code em-
bodies prior Utah law as expressed in, e.g., Nokes v. Con-
tinental Mining & Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 
954 (1954), and the law of other jurisdictions, e.g., East 
Coalinga Oil Fields Corp. v. Robinson, 86 Cal. 2d 153, 194 
P.2d 554 (1948); McCullen v. Hereford State Bank, 214 
F.2d 185 (5th Cir., 1954), all of which state the rule that 
a bona fide purchaser takes securities free of any adverse 
claim. 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code defines the 
attributes of a bona fide purchaser: 
4
 Section 70A-8-301(l), Utah Code Annotated (1953), de-
fines "adverse claim" to include plaintiff's claim in this action: 
"Upon delivery of a security the purchaser acquires the 
rights in the security which his transferor had or had 
actual authority to convey except that a purchaser who 
has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affect-
ing the security or who as a prior holder had notice of an 
adverse claim cannot improve his position by taking from 
a later bona fide purchaser. (Adverse claim9 includes a 
claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a 
particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest 
in the security." (emphasis added) 
9 
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A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value 
in good faith and without notice of any adverse 
claim who takes delivery of a security in bearer 
form or of one in registered form issued to him or 
endorsed to him in blank. §70A-2-302, U.C.A. 
There is no dispute that the stock received from 
Murray First Thrift was in bearer form. There should be 
no question that defendant gave "value" since it ex-
tinguished Mr. England's debt to it.5 There can also be 
no question but that the "adverse claim" of ownership 
alleged by plaintiff is among those that cannot be assert-
ed against a bona fide purchaser for value.6 Good faith is 
defined by the Code as "honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned."1 Certainly there is nothing in the 
record to impugn Mr. Covey's honesty. 
The trial court's determinative conclusion must, then, 
have been that defendant, through Almon Covey, had 
notice of plaintiff's adverse claim, and that this notice was 
established by the pleadings and affidavits in conformance 
with the stringent standards required for summary judg-
ment.8 This conclusion is not supported in the record. 
5
 Section 70A-1-201 (44), Utah Code Annotated, (1953). 
6
 Section 70A-8-301(l), Utah Code Annotated, defining "ad-
verse claim", set out in footnote 4, supra. 
7
 Section 70A-1-201U9), Utah Code Annotated (1953) (em-
phasis added). 
8
 The pertinent provisions of Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provide that summary judgment shall be ren-
dered only if there is on a showing "that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to judgment as a matter of law" (emphasis added). 
Summary judgment should be granted with great caution, 
Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Utah 2d 46,354 P.2d 852; only upon a show-
ing that precludes all reasonable possibility that the loser might 
prevail at trial, Green v. Gam, 11 Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050; 
with all doubts resolved in favor of permitting trial, Henry v. 
Washiki Club, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 138, 355 P.2d 973. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Covey's affidavit filed at the time of the hearing 
on plaintiffs motion for summary judgment states that 
he did not have knowledge of any adverse claim of plain-
tiff Strand. This lack of actual knowledge is not contro-
verted in the record by plaintiff and even Mr. England's 
affidavit indicates only that Mr. Covey should have been 
on notice that England held the securities for a third per-
son, possibly Mr. Strand. Notice of an adverse claim under 
§70A-8-302, U.CA. is defined in §70A-8-304(2), U.C.A.: 
The fact that the purchaser (including a broker 
for the seller or buyer) has notice that the security 
is held for a third person . . . does not create a 
duty to inquire into the rightfulness of the trans-
fer or constitute notice of adverse claims. If, how-
ever, the purchaser . . . has knowledge that the 
proceeds are being used or that the transaction is 
for the individual benefit of the fiduciary or other-
wise in breach of duty, the purchaser is charged 
with notice of adverse claims. (Emphasis added) 
Even if England's statement to the effect that Mr. 
Covey should have been on notice that England held the 
securities for a third person had been uncontroverted, the 
above section makes clear that no duty was thereby cre-
ated on defendant's part to inquire into the rightfulness 
of the transfer, let alone that such "notice" constituted 
"notice of adverse claims" under §70A-8-302. The actual 
knowledge required by the last sentence of $304(2) was 
unequivocally denied in Mr. Covey's affidavit presented 
to the court at the time of the motion for summary judg-
ment hearing. (R. 23-24). 
The plaintiff failed to show defendant's actual knowl-
edge of plaintiffs alleged ownership. Nevertheless the 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court below imputed England's knowledge of plaintiff's 
ownership of the stock to the defendant. This was error, 
England's knowledge could be imputed to Prince-Covey 
only if England was acting as an agent of Prince-Covey in 
the transaction. While an agent's knowledge is imputed 
to his principal if the knowledge is gained or used in the 
course and scope of the agent's employment, there can 
be no imputation when the agent is acting adversely to the 
principal. As stated in Restatement 2d, Agency §279: 
The principal is not affected by the knowledge of 
an agent as to matters involved in a transaction 
in which the agent deals with the principal or an-
other agent of the principal as, or on the account 
of, an adverse party. 
Illustration 2 to that section is on all fours with the instant 
case: 
Having obtained goods from T by fraud, A con-
veys them to P in consideration of the extinguish-
ment of a debt due P from A. P is not bound by 
A's knowledge in a jurisdiction in which the ex-
tinguishment of an antecedent debt is value. 
It was uncontroverted in the trial court that England was 
acting entirely for his own personal benefit, outside the 
scope of his employment, when he obtained the Hoffman 
stock from plaintiff for use as security for a personal loan. 
These transactions did not involve his employer in any 
sense. More importantly, however, Mr. England's actions 
in obtaining the shares from Murray First Thrift, selling 
them and applying the proceeds to his debt to defendant 
were not within the scope of his employment. As was well 
established in the record before the trial court, England 
12 
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dealt with defendant in these transactions as an adverse 
party. For England to accomplish his purpose he had to 
conceal his knowledge (or belief) as to plaintiff's owner-
ship in the stock. Failure to conceal this knowledge would 
have led Prince-Covey to execute on the stock in order to 
satisfy its pre-existing $34,600 judgment against plain-
tiff, and England would have continued to owe his per-
sonal debt to defendant.9 Under these circumstances the 
agent, England, had to avoid disclosure to his principal, 
Prince-Covey & Co., Inc. These circumstances fall squarely 
within the universally accepted rule expressed in Restate-
ment 2d, Agency §279, which has been applied in Utah 
as well as most other jurisdictions. 
In Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 
P.2d 906 (1943) the court stated that where "the agent 
was acting adversely to the principal . . . his knowledge 
and actions cannot be imputed to his principal," and that 
this "is the exception to the general rule that the knowl-
edge and acts of the agent will be imputed to the prin-
cipal." (135 P.2d at 912). In Western Securities Co. v. 
Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 P. 664 
(1920) the court declined to impute the knowledge of a 
director and agent of a corporation to the corporation 
when the agent was acting in his own interests in effect-
uating a sale of stock to a third party. The court said: 
9
 At best, even assuming that England did not know of de-
fendant's judgment against plaintiff, England's purpose in se-
curing the monies to reduce his debt to defendant would have 
been defeated if Mr. Covey had been told of Strand's ownership 
and had refused to participate in the conversion. It is significant 
that England nowhere alleges that he told Covey of Strand's 
ownership. 
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The law is well settled that, in case tan} . . . 
agent of a corporation transacts business in which 
he is adversely interested, his knowledge respect-
ing the particular transaction . . . is not imput-
able to the corporation, and hence it is not liable 
for his acts. 192 P. at 669. 
The court also quoted with approval the following lan-
guage from E. S. Woodworth & Co. v. Carroll, 104 Minn, 
65,112 N.W. 1054: 
"The doctrine that a principal is chargeable with 
notice of facts known to his agent is based on the 
ground that it is the duty of the agent to communi-
cate his knowledge to the principal, and that it is 
to be presumed that he has performed this duty. 
Ordinarily this presumption is conclusive. The rea-
son of the rule ceases, however, where the agent is 
dealing with the principal for his own purposes, 
or where for other reasons his interest is adverse 
to that of the principal, so that it is to his own 
advantage not to impart his knowledge to the prin-
cipal. It is accordingly well settled in the law that 
a corporation is not chargeable with notice of facts 
because of the knowledge on the part of the . . . 
agent, where the . . . agent is dealing with the 
corporation in his own interest, and where for 
other reasons his interest is adverse to that of his 
corporation, so that communication of knowledge 
by him cannot be presumed." quoted at 192 p. 
669-670 (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case Mr. England was acting in his 
own interests in extinguishing his debt to defendant. In 
addition, England must have known, in light of the state-
ment contained in his affidavit as to the antagonism be-
tween the parties, of defendant's $34,000 judgment against 
plaintiff Strand, and this knowledge made it mandatory, 
14 
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if his plan to liquidate his debt to defendant was to suc-
ceed, to keep knowledge of plaintiffs ownership of the 
stock from defendant. 
There is no authority applying a different rule to 
cases involving negotiable instruments. The Arizona Su-
preme Court in Bank of America v. Barnett, 87 Ariz. 96, 
348 P.2d 296 (I960) ruled that the knowledge of a lend-
ing institution which had endorsed certain notes to the 
plaintiff bank could not be imputed to the bank even if 
the lending institution had knowledge of the worthless-
ness of the consideration given for the notes and acted as 
the bank's agent in certain matters: 
United acted only as the bank's collection agent, 
and — because United was a prior holder of the 
notes and liable thereon in case of default and had 
in fact made warranties to the bank at the time it 
endorsed the notes in blank, which warranties are 
in conflict with the knowledge which it is pre-
sumed to have had — . . . the position of United 
was, in all other respects, adverse to that of the 
bank. 348 P.2d at 298. (Emphasis in original) 
Parallels can be drawn between the instant case and 
the Bank of America case. In both, the scope of the agency 
relationship did not include the transactions in issue, and 
in both the position of the agent was adverse to the posi-
tion of the principal — in the Bank of America case the 
agent was a warrantor to the principal, in this case a 
debtor. 
Similarly in McLean v. Paddock, 78 N.M. 234, 430 
P.2d 392 (1967), the New Mexico court ruled that the 
knowledge of an original payee on a promissory note 
15 
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could not be imputed to the parties to whom he had en-
dorsed it, even though the original payee acted as the 
holder's agent by collecting and transferring the maker's 
payments. After quoting §279 of the Restatement 2d, 
Agency, the court said: 
This rule has been applied to situations involv-
ing knowledge by an agent of equities or infirmi-
ties in promissory notes sold by the agent to the 
principal [citations}. And under this rule the prin-
cipal has been granted the status of bona fide pur-
chaser despite the agent's knowledge of wrong 
doing. 430 P.2d at 396. 
In Hays v. Bank of Arizona, 57 Ariz. 8, 110 P.2d 
235 (1941). the court held that the knowledge of a mana-
ger of a lumber company that the bank loaned him money 
to pay off certain accounts he personally owed the com-
pany was not imputed when the manager was acting to 
deceive the company. 
The rule has also been applied in cases involving 
negotiable securities in the determination of the status of 
bona fide purchaser. In all of the following cases the courts 
ruled that a principal was not bound by the knowledge of 
its agent of adverse claims in securities when the prin-
cipal and agent were in adverse positions: Western Se-
curities Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 57 Utah 
88, 192 P. 664 (1920); George H. Sasser & Co. v. Chuck 
WagonSystem, 50N.M. 136,172P.2d818 (1946); Steunen-
berg v. National Progressive Life Insurance Co., 138 Neb. 
240, 292 N.W. 737 (1940); Tallhatchie Home Bank v. 
Aldridge, 169 Miss. 597, 153 S. 818 (1934); Bloomberg v. 
Taggart, 213 Minn. 39, 5 N.W.2d 388 (1942); Union Old 
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Lowell National Bank v. Paine, 318 Mass. 313, 61 N.E.2d 
666 (1945); Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, Peoria v. W. 
Heller & Son, 305 111. App. 644, 27 N.E.2d 844 (1940); 
Montgomery v. Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, 286 
111. App. 241, 3 N.E.2d 139 (1936). 
All of these cases stand for the principle that on a 
showing of deceit by the agent against the principal, or 
if the principal and the agent are in adverse positions 
with respect to the transaction in question, the principal 
will not be bound by the agent's knowledge. 
To summarize the rule of law stated in §279 of the 
Restatement, the reporter's notes are helpful: 
It is only where the agent acts as an agent that 
the principal is affected by his knowledge If an 
agent does not act and does not purport to act as 
an agent, but acts and purports to act on his own 
account . . . the principal is not responsible for 
his conduct or for his knowledge. Thus in accord-
ance with the rule stated in this section, if the agent 
deals with the principal . . . upon matters in 
tvhich he is an adversary party, . . . acting on his 
own account . . ., the fact that he commits a 
breach of duty to his principal in acting or in fail-
ing to reveal facts in the transaction does not make 
the principal responsible for the failure. Thus 
one who is an agent has a duty to reveal all perti-
nent facts to the principal upon entering into a 
transaction with him, but the failure to do so is a 
failure by him as an individual and not a failure 
by him as the principal's agent. Restatement 2d, 
Agency, Appendix at 478-79 (1958). (Emphasis 
added). 
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In the instant case, it is clear that Mr. England was acting 
on his own personal behalf, both in his dealings with the 
plaintiff and with the defendant/Under the rules stated in 
§279 of the Restatement of Agency and in numerous cases 
from Utah and virtually every other jurisdiction, the fact 
that Mr. England was defendant's agent for other pur-
poses has no bearing on this case. Here his failure to re-
veal the true facts to his employer resulted from his per-
sonal interest in extinguishing his debt to that employer. 
Since imputation of knowledge in this case was clear 
error of law, the fact issue of defendant Prince-Covey & 
Co's. knowledge of England's breach of duty to plaintiff 
was directly in issue before the trial court on the face of 
the contradictory pleadings and affidavits that were be-
fore it. The summary judgment violated Rule 56 and 
should be reversed and remanded. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DE-
TERMINED THAT NO ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED 
CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S OWNERSHIP OF THE 
STOCK. 
Even if the bona fide purchaser question had not been 
placed squarely in issue by the pleadings and affidavits 
before the trial court, it was error for the court to de-
termine that no issues of fact existed concerning plaintiff's 
ownership of the Hoffman Resources stock. Plaintiff's 
allegation in his complaint that he "owned" the stock 
was specifically denied by defendant's answer. Mr. Eng-
land's affidavit, in which his knowledge of plaintiffs 
interest in the stock was asserted, was obviously self-serv-
ing and could not be contradicted by counter-affidavit 
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from defendant's own knowledge. As is shown by the 
affidavit of Mr. Heyrend, plaintiff himself testified under 
oath pursuant to an order in supplemental proceedings 
that he did not own the Hoffman Resources stock on July 
20, 1972. Accordingly, defendant's denial is based not 
only on lack of knowledge but on the inference that if 
plaintiff did not own the stock on July 20, 1972 he could 
not have owned it on August 2, 1972, the date of the 
alleged conversion, since on that date and at all times 
from January 1972 to August 2, 1972 the stock was 
pledged to and in the possession of Murray First Thrift 
securing payment of a personal loan to Ted England. 
England's statement of his belief of plaintiff's owner-
ship could not have been contradicted by defendant be-
cause such statements are inherently uncontradictable 
without the examination of the person making them. Faced 
with this type of evidence in Cross v. United States, 336 
F.2d 431 (1964), where a taxpayer had obtained summary 
judgment on his claim that certain travel expenses should 
be allowed as proper deductions from his income tax, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Grcuit 
noted that: 
Many of the facts [concerning the taxpayer's travel 
as set forth in his affidavits} remain largely within 
his own knowledge and the government should 
have the opportunity to test his credibility on cross-
examination . . . . 336 F.2d at 433 
It went on to say that: 
While we have recently emphasized that ordinarily 
the bare allegations of the pleadings, unsupported 
by specific evidentiary data, will not alone defeat 
a motion for summary judgment [citation}, this 
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principle does not justify summary relief where, 
as here, the disputed questions of fact turn ex-
clusively on the credibility of movant's witnesses. 
Id. 
The circuit ruled that the question could not be decided 
by the affidavit alone, and reversed the trial court.10 While 
in the instant case defendant's right to a trial does not 
"turn exclusively on the credibility of movant's witnesses", 
at least the question of plaintiff's ownership of the stock, 
on the present state of the record, must have been decided 
by the trial court exclusively on England's affidavit. Thus, 
as to this fact the Cross rule must apply and must neces-
sarily compel reversal of the summary judgment. 
When England's affidavit is read in its entirety its 
self-serving nature is apparent; his breach of duty to 
plaintiff is admitted on its face, but only for the purpose 
of establishing defendant's liability. In such circumstances 
the credibility of the affiant himself properly becomes a 
matter at issue, and credibility is not an issue that can be 
disposed of at a hearing on a motion for summary judg-
ment with only pleadings and affidavits before the court. 
On the issue of ownership the demeanor and tone of Eng-
land must be subjected to the test of trial, and for these 
reasons defendant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erred in accepting the pleadings and affidavit of Mr. Eng-
land as establishing plaintiff's ownership interest in the 
stock. 
10
 See also Armtein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Gir., 1940), 
for a similar discussion concerning the propriety of summary 
judgment based on self-serving affidavits. 
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Summary judgment in the instant case necessarily 
ignored the often repeated instructions of this court that a 
showing supporting summary judgment must preclude 
all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a 
trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain 
a judgment in his favor, see, e.g. Green v. Gam, 11 Utah 
2d 375, 359 P.2d 1050 (1961); Frederick May & Co. v. 
Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). 
Defendant respectfully submits that the allegations 
and sworn statements upon which the trial court must 
have based its findings of ownership do not meet this test. 
As stated above plaintiff's only "proof" of his ownership 
of the stock comes from the allegation of his complaint 
and is denied by defendant's answer. Mr. England's alle-
gation of plaintiff's ownership is simply unsupported 
hearsay evidence of his belief which would have 
been inadmissible to prove plaintiff's ownership in any 
trial of this matter. 
Plaintiff's right to summary judgment is improper 
for other reasons as well. An essential element of an ac-
tion for conversion is the defendant's intentional interfer-
ence with plaintiff's right to immediate possession of the 
property, Restatement 2d, Torts §222A. Thus, to prevail 
in an action for conversion the plaintiff must show a right 
to immediate possession of the property at the time it was 
converted, Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 233 P.2d 365 
(1951); Johnson v. Flowers, 119 Utah 425, 228 P.2d 406 
(1951). 
Even under plaintiffs own allegations he did not 
have a right to immediate possession of the stock because 
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it was twice pledged, once to England and once to Murray 
First Thrift, by England, with plaintiffs permission. Al-
though the stock was released from the pledge to Murray 
First Thrift when England's loan was repaid, there is no 
allegation that plaintiff ever performed whatever obliga-
tion was necessary to release the stock from the pledge to 
England. Such consideration is obviously necessary if, as 
plaintiff pleads, the stock was in fact pledged by him to 
England, since the essence of a pledge is the passing of 
possession by the owner to the pledgee who is entitled to 
hold it until the debt is paid or the obligation is per-
formed (see Campbell v. Peters, 108 Utah 565, 162 P.2d 
754). If plaintiff did, in fact, "pledge" the stock to Eng-
land, then he had no right to possession of it at the time 
of the alleged conversion and would not have had such 
right until he had performed or tendered the performance 
of the obligation secured by the pledge. If, of course, it 
was not pledged, then a multitude of issues arise concern-
ing plaintiff's interests in the stock that could not be re-
solved by the pleadings and affidavits before the court. 
In either event summary judgment was improper. 
C. A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTED AS TO THE 
PROPER DATE FOR FIXING DAMAGES. 
The plaintiff accurately sets out the rule for fixing 
damages for conversion of securities in paragraph 11 of 
his complaint: 
. . . the highest market value obtained for the 
shares of Hoffman Resources, Inc. within a rea-
sonable time after plaintiff had notice of the con-
version. 
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In paragraph 12 plaintiff alleges that the "highest market 
value reached by Hoffman Resources, Inc. common stock 
within a reasonable time after plaintiff had notice of the 
conversion was $6.50 per share." Defendant denied this 
allegation upon information and belief.11 Plaintiff does 
not set out the time at which he received notice in his 
complaint, nor does the affidavit of Mr, England state 
when he might have informed plaintiff of his breach of 
duty. Mr. Covey's affidavit makes it very clear that the 
stock was not sold on September 13 as asserted by Mr. 
Strand and Mr. England, but on August 2, approximately 
six weeks earlier. 
From this, two points are evident. First, the burden 
was on plaintiff to establish notice of the conversion after 
his allegation regarding notice was denied in the pleadings. 
This plaintiff failed to do. Had this matter been tried and 
had plaintiff brought on his expert to testify as to the 
price of the stock on September 22, 1972, the defendant 
would have objected that no foundation had been laid for 
that date as a proper one on which to fix damages because 
nothing was in evidence as to the date of plaintiff's notice 
or knowledge of the conversion. Plaintiffs expert would 
have been in no position to establish the date of notice. 
Plaintiff would not have been heard to argue that his 
allegation of time of notice established that fact and that 
he need adduce no evidence for it. In fact, the testimony 
of Mr. Strand or Mr. England would have been required 
11
 "If [a defendant] is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall 
so state and this has the effect of a denial." Rule 8(b), Uah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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as to when Strand learned or was told of England's breach 
of duty. 
At the hearing for summary judgment, however, 
plaintiff was allowed to establish his damages without any 
proof of the date of his notice of the alleged conversion. 
The fixing of such a date is a vital element in proof of 
damages for conversion of stock, since the general rule and 
the rule that has been announced in Utah is that the offend-
ed party is entitled to the highest price within a rea-
sonable time after he has learned of the conversion, West-
ern Secur. Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 57 Utah 
88, 192 P. 664; Anno., "Conversion of Stock — Dam-
ages," 31 ALR3d 1286. It would be incongruous to allow 
plaintiff to obtain summary judgment on a lesser showing 
than he would be compelled to make at trial. Such a re-
sult would contradict both the express language of Rule 
56 and this court's statement that, for purposes of sum-
mary judgment, if any material fact asserted by plaintiff 
is contradicted by defendant, the facts as stated by de-
fendant must be taken as true, Disabled American Vet-
erans v. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 (1959). 
Secondly, since the actual date of the sale of the stock, 
as established by Mr. Covey's second affidavit, was August 
2, 1972, and Mr. Strand apparently recalls that he re-
ceived notice very soon after the sale, a substantial ques-
tion is raised as to whether September 22 was within a rea-
sonable time after the notice. Plaintiff himself says that 
less than nine days is a reasonable time since he relies on 
the price on September 22 and alleges that the sale took 
place on September 13 and he learned of it soon afterwards. 
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A "reasonable time" depends on many factors including 
among others, the state of the market for the stock and 
the reasonableness of the offended party's behavior after 
notice, see §5[e}, Annotation, 31 ALR3d at 1332-34. On 
the state of the record in this case, it would be fruitless to 
argue what a reasonable time might be, but numerous 
cases collected in the ALR Annotation just cited have 
declared periods shorter than the 51 days between August 
2 and September 22 to be unreasonable. More facts would 
have to be before the court before this determination could 
be made. This void in the record makes summary judg-
ment improper. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND FOR REHEARING. 
Upon its motion to set aside judgment and for re-
hearing, defendant amplified the evidence concerning its 
relationship to Mr. England and showed that two impor-
tant facts had not been brought to the attention of the 
trial court upon plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 
First, the affidavit of Michael F. Heyrend showed 
that defendant's denial of plaintiff's ownership of the 
stock in question was based upon inference, derived from 
the examination of plaintiff under oath. 
Secondly, the affidavit of Almon Covey established 
that the sale of the stock occurred on August 2 rather than 
September 13, as alleged by plaintiff. 
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Mr, Heyrend's affidavit establishes that plaintiff had 
testified under oath approximately thirteen days before 
the sale of the stock that he did not own any Hoffman 
Resources stock. Obviously he could not have obtained 
the stock in the meantime since it was pledged at Murray 
First Thrift. In addition, after his testimony as to his 
impecuniousity given on July 20, it is hard to see how he 
could have paid for over $13,500 worth of stock on Au-
gust 2. Although these facts merely corroborate, substanti-
ate, and make vivid and clear, defendant's contention that 
genuine issues of material fact existed as to plaintiffs 
ownership of the stock and as to the damages when the 
summary judgment was entered, the trial court should 
have applied Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and granted defendant relief from the summary judgment: 
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: . . . (7) any other reason justifying re-
lief from the operation of the judgment. 
Defendant concedes that none of the first six reasons 
enumerated in Rule 60(b) is applicable to this situation. 
However, relief under (7) of this rule was appropriate in 
this case. Certainly no prejudice would accrue to plaintiff 
by granting the relief requested, since he knew of his prior 
sworn testimony concerning the ownership of the stock, 
and the motion for relief was made expeditiously. Plain-
tiff, therefore, respectfully submits that the trial court 
should have granted the motion. 
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POINT III 
IF JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT IS 
AFFIRMED, THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER 
A SET-OFF BETWEEN THIS JUDGMENT 
AND A PRIOR FINAL JUDGMENT OB-
TAINED BY DEFENDANT AGAINST PLAIN-
... TIFF. , , 
On May 11, 1972, defendant Prince-Covey & Co., 
Inc. obtained a judgment against plaintiff Jerry Strand in 
the amount of $34,696.16, together with interest and 
costs, which was affirmed by this court in Prince-Covey 
& Co., Inc. v. Strcmd, 29 Utah 2d 224, 507 P.2d 708. De-
spite diligent efforts by defendant, including the order in 
supplemental proceedings of July 20,1972, in which plain-
tiff Strand testified under oath that he did not own any 
Hoffman Resources stock or have any other assets upon 
which execution could be levied, defendant to date has 
been unable to satisfy any part of this judgment. If judg-
ment for plaintiff is affirmed in this case, this court should 
order satisfaction of it by set-off against the previous 
judgment in defendant's favor. The principal amount of 
defendant's judgment exceeds the amount of summary 
judgment granted in this case by $8,696.16, which would 
leave defendant with an unsatisfied judgment against 
plaintiff in that amount plus accrued interest. 
As a general rule, a judgment creditor may be forced 
to accept in payment a judgment to which he is subject, 
see generally 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §§999-1013, 
Anno. 121 ALR 478 (1939); and Snow v. West, 37 Utah 
528, 110 P. 52, 54 (1910) where the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the granting of set-off of judgments, saying: 
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Whether mutual judgments should be set off and 
satisfied in that way, rather than by the ordinary 
method of enforcing them, rests largely within the 
discretion of the court to which the application 
is made. . . . Ordinarily . . . the application should 
be made in equity and the matter should be con-
trolled by equitable principles. 110 P.2d at 54 
(Emphasis added). 
Clearly the equities in this case demand a set-off of 
the opposing judgments. Appellant has been diligent in 
seeking to execute upon its judgment, yet has been un-
able to locate nonexempt assets of plaintiff Strand on 
which to levy. If judgment in the present action is affirm-
ed and no set-off granted, defendants will run the risk 
of being forced to pay the judgment to plaintiff and then 
losing any right to a return of such a payment to satisfy 
its earlier judgment against plaintiff. If defendant were 
forced to pay his judgment, there is no guarantee that it 
could immediately levy execution on the funds so paid 
since pre-existing liens might prevent effective execution. 
Thus, the unjust result might occur that plaintiff would 
be able to collect his judgment against defendant, but de-
fendant would not be able to collect its pre-existing judg-
ment against plaintiff because of intervening interests. 
The fact that defendant did not plead set-off of the 
prior judgment as a counterclaim should not preclude 
this court from granting such a set-off. The prior judg-
ment is not a compulsory counterclaim because it did not 
"arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of the opposing party's claim." Rule 13(a), 
U.R.C.P. Hence, there is no requirement that it be affirma-
tively pleaded. 
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Even though offset of the judgment might be assert-
ed as a permissive counterclaim, the fact that it was not so 
asserted does not preclude this court from ordering said 
set-off since an appellate court has the power to grant 
set-off between judgments; see, e.g. Welsher v. Libby, 107 
Wis. 47, 82 N.W. 693 (1900); Annot. 121 ALR at 491. 
Defendant submits that if the judgment below is not re-
versed, this would be an appropriate occasion for the 
exercise of this power. 
CONCLUSION 
Numerous genuine issues of material fact remained 
unresolved when the trial court entered its summary judg-
ment. It was a clear error of law to impute Mr. England's 
knowledge to defendant. For these reasons, the judgment 
below should be reserved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD, 
MILLER & GELDZAHLER 
F. S. Prince, Jr. 
Michael F. Heyrend 
J. Rand Hirschi 
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APPENDIX A 
(R. 1} 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




PRINCE-COVEY AND COMPANY, 
INC. and ALMON COVEY, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Alleges: 
1. Prince Covey and Company, Inc. is a Utah corpo-
ration engaging in the over-the-counter brokerage busi-
ness and doing busines in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
and the defendant Almon Covey is an individual residing 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff was the owner of 6,000 shares of the 
common stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc. 
3. On or about the 13th day of January, 1972, the 
plaintiff pledged with an individual, Ted England, his 
6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources, Inc. for the specific 
purpose of having Mr. England pledge those securities as 
security for a loan. 
4. That said individual Ted England was indebted 
to the defendants. 
5. At all times pertinent herein Ted England acted 
as the agent and the employee of the defendant and the 




31 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. That the defendant learned of the pledge of com-
mon stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc. at the lending insti-
tution which had loaned Mr. England the forementioned 
moneys. 
7. That at all times pertinent herein, the defendants, 
and each of them, knew that the Hoffman Resources, Inc. 
common stock which had been pledged as security for a 
loan by Mr. England was in fact the property of the plain-
tiff. 
[R. 2} 
8. On September 13, 1972, the defendant Almon 
Covey for himself and as agent of Prince Covey tendered 
to the lending institution the sums borrowed by Mr. Eng-
land and in return therefore received the common stock 
owned by the plaintiff. Thereafter, contrary to the rights 
of plaintiff, the defendants exercised ownership rights 
over the common stock of Hoffman Resources, Inc. and, 
upon information and belief, sold the same. 
9. Upon information and belief, the proceeds from 
the sale by defendant of plaintiff's stock were used to 
liquidate indebtedness of Mr. England to the defendants. 
10. The actions and conduct of the defendant in 
exercising ownership rights and selling the common stock 
owned by plaintiff, constitute an intentional conversion. 
11. That as a result of the conversion of the plain-
tiff's common stock, the defendants are liable to plain-
tiff for the highest market value obtained for the shares 
of Hoffman Resources, Inc. within a reasonable time after 
plaintiff had notice of the conversion. 
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12. The highest market value reached by Hoffman 
Resources, Inc. common stock within a reasonable time 
after plaintiff had notice of the conversion was $6.50 per 
share. 
13. The plaintiff is entitled to damages from the 
defendant in the sum of $39,000.00. 
14. Inasmuch as the action of the defendants was 
intentional and full knowledge of plaintiff's rights to the 
stock, the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in the 
sum of $10,000.00. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays judgment against the 
defendant for the sum of $39,000.00 general damage to-
gether with $10,000.00 punitive damages, interest, costs, 
and other relief the court deems just and proper. 
DATED this 13 day of February, 1974. 
RICHARD J. LEEDY 
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APPENDIX B 
{R. 6} 
ANSWER OF PRINCE COVEY & CO. 
[heading deleted in printing] 
Defendants, Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. and 
Almon Covey, by and through their attorneys, Prince, 
Yeates, Ward, Miller & Geldzahler, answer plaintiffs 
Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim against de-
fendants upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in 
paragraph 1 of the Complaint. 
3. Defendants are without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allega-
tions contained in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and 
therefore deny same. 
4. Defendants are without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allega-
tions contained in paragraph 3 of the Complaint and 
therefore deny same. 
5. Defendants admit that Ted England was in-
debted to defendant Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. De-
fendants deny that Ted England was indebted to Almon 
Covey. 
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6. Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
CR. 7} 
paragraph 5 of the Complaint, 
7. Defendants admit that they learned of Ted Eng-
land's pledge of Hoffman Resources stock, but deny that 
they learned of plaintiff's "pledge" of the stock to Ted 
England then or at any material time subsequent. 
8. Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
paragraph 7 of the Complaint. 
9. Defendants deny each and every allegation con-
tained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint. 
10. Defendants admit that the proceeds from the 
sale of a portion of 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources, 
Inc. were used to liquidate England's indebtedness to 
Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. and deny every other 
allegation contained in paragraph 9 of the Complaint. 
11. Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
paragraph 10 of the Complaint. 
12. Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
paragraph 11 of the Complaint. 
13. Defendants are without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the alle-
gations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint and 
therefore deny same. 
14. Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
paragraph 13 of the Complaint. 
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15. Defendants deny the allegations contained in 
paragraph 14 of the Complaint. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
16. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to join an indispen-
sable party, Ted England, 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that plaintiff take 
nothing by way of his Complaint and that defendants be 
awarded costs and such other relief as the Court shall 
deem just and proper. 
Dated this 14th day of April, 1974. 
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD, 
MILLER & GELDZAHLER 
F. S. Prince, Jr. 
Michael F. Heyrend 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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APPENDIX C 
(R. 12} 
AFFIDAVIT OF MACK McBRIDE 
[heading deleted in printing] 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Mack McBride being first put on his oath deposes 
and says: 
1. That he is the office manager of Brown Securities, 
an over-the-counter broker-dealer firm, located in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
2. That Brown Securities was a market maker in the 
stock of Hoffman Resources Corporation during January 
through December of 1972. 
3. That affiant has reviewed the trading transaction 
in Hoffman Resources Corporation for the period of time 
of September 1972. 
4. That affiant has ascertained from trading trans-
actions that Hoffman Resources Corporation was quoted 
on September 22, 1972, at $6.25 bid at $6.75 ask with 
transactions being made at prices between the bid and ask 
on that date. 
DATED this the 28th day of June, 1974. 
MACK McBRIDE 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this the 28th 
day of June, 1974. 
Rita Watts, 
Notary Public, Residing in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
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APPENDIX D 
CR. 19} 
AFFIDAVIT OF TED ENGLAND 
[heading deleted in printing] 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Ted England being first put on his oath deposes and 
says: 
1. That he previously was employed as an account 
executive and trader with Prince Covey and Company of 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Prince Covey and Company is an over the 
counter brokerage firm and Almon Covey is the principal, 
substantial stockholder, officer, and director of Prince 
Covey and Company. 
3. On or before the 13th day of January, 1972, your 
affiant borrowed 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources com-
mon stock from plaintiff Jerry V. Strand. 
4. Your affiant borrowed said shares to use as 
collateral for a loan he was to secure with Murray First 
Thrift of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
5. That he was borrowing said money for the pur-
pose of using the proceeds to pay to Prince Covey and 
Company on losses that had been sustained by Prince 
Covey and Company due to trading transactions in which 
your affiant acted as the trader and also from customers 
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failing to pay for stock purchases on accounts at Prince 
Covey and Company which your affiant acted as account 
executive. 
6. A portion of the proceeds of the above loan were 
paid for the purposes mentioned above. 
CR. 20} 
7. Prince Covey and Company had substantial losses 
due to trading transactions in which I acted as trader and 
for customers failing to pay for purchases in accounts 
in which I acted as account executive. 
8. As a result of those losses, your affiant, subse-
quent to the procurement of the loan, agreed with Almon 
Covey to have Prince Covey and Company pay off the 
above mentioned loans, obtain the pledged Hoffman Re-
sources stock, and sell the same to mitigate those losses. 
9. That on the 13th day of September, 1972, your 
affiant in the company of Almon Covey, paid off affiant's 
loan with Murray First Thrift. 
10. Payment on that loan was made with a Prince 
Covey and Company check. 
11. At the time of the payoff of the loan, your 
affiant and Almon Covey obtained possession of 4,000 
shares of Hoffman Resources stock that had been pledged 
to secure the loan; 2,000 shares having previously been 
picked up by affiant and sold with the proceeds being paid 
to Prince Covey; all 6,000 shares were owned by Jerry 
V. Strand. 
39 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12. Then Prince Covey and Company sold the Hoff-
man Resources stock. 
13. The proceeds from the sale were divided to 
cover the losses mentioned above and a portion was given 
tome. 
14. Jerry V. Strand got none of the proceeds from 
the sale of his stock by Prince Covey and Company. 
15. Your affiant knew that Jerry V. Strand and 
Almon Covey were antagonists. 
16. Almon Covey had prohibited your affiant from 
making a market in Hoffman Resources stock at Prince 
Covey and Company for the reason that he knew the stock 
was being sponsored by Jerry V. Strand. 
17. Almon Covey knew that your affiant was in-
solvent and did not have sufficient assets to pay off the 
losses of Prince Covey and Company due to your affiant's 
trading transactions and customers failure to pay. 
18. It is common knowledge and my belief that 
Almon Covey knew that very few persons would have 
blocks of Hoffman Resources common stock as large as 
6,000 shares and that Jerry V. Strand would be one of 
those few persons that would have such a sizeable block 
and that Almon Covey knew that your affiant would not 
have ownership of such a large block of Hoffman Re-
sources common stock. 
{R. 21] 
19. Almon Covey knew or should have known that 
the stock which he took receipt of from Murray First 
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Thrift and affiant belonged to Jerry V. Strand or, at 
least, did not belong to affiant. 
20. At any rate, your affiant, an employee and agent 
of Prince Covey and Company, knew the Hoffman Re-
sources stock belonged to Jerry V. Strand; that it was not 
to be sold; that Mr. Strand did not authorize the sale 
thereof; but the stock was only to be used as collateral for 
loan; and that Jerry V. Strand never received any of the 
proceeds from the sale or loan. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT. 
DATED this 19th day of June, 1974. 
TED ENGLAND 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
19th day of June, 1974. 
J. V. Strand, 
Notary Public. 
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APPENDIX E 
{R. 23) 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALMON COVEY 
[heading deleted in printing] 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
ALMON COVEY, being first duly sworn, on oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is a defendant in the above-entitled ac-
tion and is also President and director of co-defendant 
Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. 
2. Affiant at all material times was unaware that 
plaintiff Jerry Strand claimed ownership or was in fact 
owner of the 6,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock 
which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, and affiant 
had no reason to believe that plaintiff claimed ownership. 
3. Plaintiff's name did not appear on the certificates 
which were subsequently sold to liquidate Ted England's 
debt to Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. 
4. Only a portion of the 6,000 shares were sold to 
liquidate the indebtedness of Ted England, and Ted Eng-
land retained the balance of the shares, the disposition of 
which by England is unknown to defenndants Almon 
Covey and Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. 
5. Defendants Almon Covey and Prince-Covey and 
Company, Inc. were not aware of the solvency or insol-
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vency of Ted England, but were informed that Ted Eng-
land had pledged Hoffman Resources stock to secure a 
loan. Defendants Almon Covey and Prince-Covey and 
Company, Inc. were not aware nor could they draw the 
inference from the fact that since Ted England had a large 
block of Hoffman Resources stock that it would follow 
that Jerry Strand, the plaintiff in the above-entitled ac-
tion, was in fact the owner of said shares. 
6. If Ted England knew that plaintiff claimed an 
interest in the Hoffman Resources stock, he misrepre-
sented the ownership of the stock to defendants. All ac-
tions and representations made or engaged in by Ted 
England covering the stock which is the subject matter of 
the action were not within the scope of employment of 
England, but were personal in nature. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
ALMON COVEY 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day 
of July, 1974. 
Connie C. Wilson, 
Notary Public 
43 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX F 
(R. 35] 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALMON COVEY 
[heading deleted in printing] 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ALMON COVEY, being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is an officer and director of defendant 
corporation Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. 
2. Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. is a brokerage 
firm engaging principally as a broker-dealer in over-the-
counter securities transactions. 
3. During 1972 Ted England was employed as a 
registered representative of Prince-Covey and Company, 
Inc. His duties consisted of acting as broker and agent 
for customers of Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. in con-
nection with the purchase and sale of securities. 
4. In this capacity, Ted England's duties consisted 
of soliciting and taking orders for purchases and sales of 
securities on behalf of customers and the furnishing of 
investment information and advice. 
5. Ted England was allowed to maintain, and did 
maintain a private brokerage account at Prince-Covey and 
Company, Inc., the use and maintenance of which were 
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[R. 36} 
entirely personal to Ted England and were not related 
to his duties as a registered representative for Prince-
Covey and Company, Inc. 
6. Pursunt to an agreement between Prince-Covey 
and Company, Inc. and Ted England, Ted England was 
personally responsible to the company for any losses ac-
cruing to it by reason of unauthorized actions of adminis-
trative errors taken by him as a registered representative. 
7. During the course of England's employment, 
England accrued a substantial debt to defendant corpo-
ration by virtue of such unauthorized actions and errors. 
8. During the course of his employment, affiant had 
numerous conversations with England concerning the 
liquidation of that debt, which varied month to month as a 
result of monthly accruals and payments made by Eng-
land. 
9. On or about the last of July or the first day of 
August, affiant was informed by England that England 
had secured a loan from Murray First Thrift some months 
prior and that as security he had pledged over 4,000 shares 
of Hoffman Resources stock, which stock was then worth 
more than the balance of the debt to Murray First Thrift. 
10. England proposed to affiant that Prince-Covey 
and Company, Inc. advance England the loan balance, 
that England would pay the loan, and that he would sell 
the stock and pay the proceeds to Prince-Covey and Com-
pany, Inc. to reduce his indebtedness. 
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11. On or about August 2, 1972, affiant directed 
the issuance of a check, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by reference. The 
check was made payable to Ted England and was in the 
amount of $4,300.00. 
12. On the same day affiant accompanied Ted Eng-
land to Murray First Thrift, where the check was de-
livered to Murray First Thrift and said shares of Hoff-
man Resources stock were delivered to England. Said 
stock was not registered in England's nor in plaintiffs 
name, but was in bearer form. 
13. Affiant and England then returned to the 
CR. 37} 
offices of Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. 
14. England then sold the 4,000 shares of Hoffman 
Resources stock obtained at Murray First Thrift and the 
proceeds thereof were credited to his account. Attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 2 
are records of England's personal account through which 
the sales were effected at a total sales price of $13,500.00. 
Of this amount, $4,300.00 was retained by Prince-Covey 
and Company, Inc. to repay its advance which was paid 
to Murray First Thrift, and the balance of $9,200.00 was 
applied to the reduction of England's debt to Prince-Covey 
and Company, Inc. The balance of the shares received 
from Murray First Thrift were retained by England and 
affiant has no knowledge as to the disposition thereof. 
15. England at all material times acted as principal 
for himself under circumstances where defendant Prince-
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Covey and Company, Inc. and England were in opposi-
tion and were antagonists. 
16. The repayment of the loan, the securing of the 
stock, its sale and the subsequent application of the pro-
ceeds to England's indebtedness were acts of England 
which bore no relation to England's duties at Prince-
Covey and Company, Inc. other than the fact that the 
debt owed to England to defendant corporation was in-
curred during his employment. 
17. England at no time during the transactions acted 
as agent for affiant or Prince-Covey and Company, Inc. 
18. England at no time prior to this transaction indi-
cated or implied to affiant that the Hoffman Resources 
stock was plaintiff Strand's or that Strand claimed an 
interest therein. 
19. The records of England's personal account at-
tached hereto as Exhibit 2, which records are maintained 
in the usual and regular business of Prince-Covey and 
Company, Inc. reveal that England during 1972 traded 
large quantities of Hoffman Resources stock. 
CR- 38] 
Further affiant saith naught. 
ALMON COVEY 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of 
July, 1974. 
Donald Jay Gamble 
Notary Public residing at: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX G 
(R. 44} 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL F. HEYREND 
[heading deleted in printing] 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MICHAEL F. HEYREND, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is legal counsel to Prince, Covey and 
Company and was counsel for Prince Covey and Com-
pany in July of 1972. 
2. Defendant Prince Covey and Company, on or 
about May 11, 1972, was awarded judgment against Jerry 
Strand after trial in the amount of $34,696.16 for Jerry 
Strand's failure to pay for stocks after placing orders 
through Prince Covey and Company. 
3. Pursuant to an attempt to collect the judgment 
which was entered against Jerry Strand in favor of Prince 
Covey and Company, affiant caused the issuance of an 
Order in Supplemental Proceedings compelling Jerry V. 
Strand to appear in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to be examined concern-
ing his assets and liabilities. 
4. On or about July 20, 1972, plaintiff, in compli-
ance with said order, appeared in the Third Judicial Dis-
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trict Court for Salt Lake County before the Court, where 
he was duly sworn, placed upon the witness stand, and 
examined by affiant. 
CR. 45} 
5. During the course of the examination of plain-
tiff, affiant asked plaintiff if he owned any stocks, and if 
so, the names of each stock and the location. 
6. Plaintiff stated to affiant that the only stock he 
owned was 7,000 to 8,000 shares of Dusenburg Corpora-
tion stock which stock was pledged as security for a loan 
procured by plaintiff at Murray First Thrift. 
7. Plaintiff went on to state to affiant that he owned 
options on 20,000 shares of Hoffman Resources stock at 
$3.00 per share and that the options were through Sham-
rock Fund in Los Angeles, California, but that he did 
not own any Hoffman Resources stock. 
8. Plaintiff at no time on July 20, 1972, mentioned 
any interest in stock allegedly loaned to Ted England, 
which loan plaintiff claims took place in January of 1972, 
prior to the hearing. 
9. Affiant next asked plaintiff if he held any stock 
through nominees. Plaintiff responded that he had used 
nominees in the past, but that no stock was held in the 
name of nominees as of July 20, 1972. 
10. Finally, affiant inquired as to any notes or other 
choses in action held by plaintiff and was told that the 
only amount owing to plaintiff was $5,000.00 owed to 
plaintiff by Mr. Al Johnson. 
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11. Affiant attempted to procure a transcript of the 
above hearing, but was informed and believes that the 
tapes made by the Certified Court Reporter were destroy-
ed due to age. 
FURTHER, affiant sayeth naught. 
MICHAEL F. HEYREND 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
30th day of July, 1974. 
Jacquelin Humphrey, 
Notary Public 
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX H 
CR. 46} 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID NELSON 
[heading deleted in printing] 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
DAVID NELSON, being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is an officer of defendant corporation 
Prince-Covey and Company and is employed by the com-
pany, among other things, to maintain the records which 
are kept in the usual course of business at Prince-Covey 
and Company. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct 
copy of the appropriate records maintained by Prince-
Covey and Company reflecting the personal account of 
Ted England. Said records evidence that on August 2, 
1972, 4,000 shares of Hoffman Resources were sold 
through England's account, that prior thereto England 
purchased and sold blocks of Hoffman Resources stock of 
comparable size, and that no sale of this size took place 
on or about September 22, 1974. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
DAVID NELSON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of 
July, 1974. 
Nancy S. Druce, 
Notary Public residing at: 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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